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The rehabilitation of the drive in 
neuropsych oanalysis: from sexuality 
to self-preservation
Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard
The bridge between neuroscience and psych oanalysis
In the course of the last quarter century, and in tandem with the expo-
nential growth in neuroscientifi c research, a number of writings have 
been published that address the relationship between psychoanalysis 
and the neurosciences.1 Many of those writings have been character-
ized by their desire for the establishment of cordial relations, at the 
very least, or for future marriage, at their most optimistic. The hope 
that animates such desires is that the empirical potency of current 
brain-based neuropsychological research can amplify or clarify Freud’s 
insights regarding the psychical apparatus. The Nobel Prize-winning 
neuroscientist Eric Kandel, for example, argued in 1998 that »The fu-
ture of psychoanalysis, if it is to have a future, is in the context of an 
empirical psychology, abett ed by imaging techniques, neuroanatomical 
methods, and human genetics«.2 Kandel followed this statement a year 
later with a stronger call for the creation of a unifi ed discipline: »One 
would hope that the excitement and success of current biology would 
1 See for example Rachel B. Blass and Zvi Carmeli: »Th Awareness, Desire e Case against 
Neuropsychoanalysis: On Fallacies Underlying Psychoanalysis’ Latest Scientific Trend 
and Its Negative Impact on Psychoanalytic Discourse,« in: International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis, 88 (2007), 19−40; Arnold M. Cooper: »Will Neurobiology Influence Psycho-
analysis?,« in: Am I Psychiatry, 142 (1985), 1395−1402; Eric R. Kandel: »Biology and the 
Future of Psychoanalysis: A new Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry Revisited,« in: 
Am I Psychiatry, 156 (1999), 505−521; Eric R. Kandel: »A New Intellectual Framework for 
Psychiatry,« in: Am I Psychiatry, 155 (1998), 457−469; Eric R. Kandel: Psychiatry, Psycho-
analysis, and the New Biology of Mind, Arlington 2005; Mauro Mancia: »Implicit Memory 
and Early Unpressed Unconscious: Their Role in the Therapeutic Process,« in: International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 87 (2006), 83−103; Jaak Panksepp: »Neuro-Psychoanalysis May 
Enliven the Mindbrain Sciences,« in: Cortex, 43 (2007), 1106−1107; Sydney E. Pulver: 
»On the Astonishing Clinical Irrelevance of Neuroscience,« in: Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association 51, 1−18; Oliver Turnbull & Mark Solms: »Awareness, Desire 
and False Beliefs: Freud in the Light of Modern Neuropsychology,« in: Cortex, 43 (2007), 
1083−1090; Oliver Turnbull & Mark Solms: »Big Issues, Little Issues …,« in: Cortex, 43 
(2007), 1116−1121; Watt: »The Dialogue between Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: 
Alienation and Reparation,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 2 (2000), 183−192.
2 Kandel: »A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry,« (note 1), 468.
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rekindle the investigative curiosities of the psychoanalytic community 
and that a unifi ed discipline of neurobiology, cognitive psychology, and 
psychoanalysis would forge a new and deeper understanding of mind«.3 
The emergence of neuropsychoanalysis comprises a vigorous response 
to Kandel’s hopeful prompting.
The nascent fi eld of neuropsychoanalysis positions itself as a putative 
bridge between two »historically divided disciplines«.4 In this chapter, 
we address this att empt to bridge these two disciplines, through consid-
ering a particular scientifi c and conceptual debate that is taking place 
within this new fi eld. Neuropsychoanalysis is a diverse and loosely 
defi ned interdisciplinary fi eld that comprises the eﬀ orts of researchers 
and clinicians within several branches of both psychoanalysis and the 
neurosciences to construct a shared space of inquiry in which clinical 
concepts and fi ndings can be correlated with neuronal data and models.5 
While researchers diﬀ er in how they conceptualize the specifi c contours 
of this shared space, they tend to converge in their desire to fi gure out 
3 Kandel: »Biology and the Future of Psychoanalysis,« (note 1).
4 This phrase is taken from the editors’ introduction to the first issue of Neuro-Psychoanalysis. 
Edward Nersessian & Mark Solms: »Editors’ Introduction,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 
(1999), 3−4. The one significant critique of neuropsychoanalysis published to date, that 
by Rachel Blass and Zvi Carmeli, argues that, far from being a bridge between two 
disciplines, neuropsychoanalysis »rather leads to a new perspective on the nature of 
psychoanalysis – a biologistic one«. They argue that the debate over neuropsychoanalysis 
is therefore a debate »over the very essence and aims of psychoanalysis«. Blass and Car-
meli: »The Case against Neuropsychoanalysis,« (note 1), p. 20. Our chapter, while sharing 
Blass and Carmeli’s critical focus on the role of biology within neuropsychoanalysis, 
is preoccupied with a different issue. Their critique centres on the marginalization of 
»psychological meaning, truth and ideas« (p. 37) within what they see as a biologized 
neuropsychoanalysis. Our concern here lies in the way in which neuropsychoanalysis 
positions the drive in the service of self-preservation, which, we suggest, has ramifications 
for how it conceptualizes the psyche, and for how it uses and interprets neuroscientific 
findings.
5 We shall use the words neuropsychoanalysis and neuropsychoanalysts as umbrella terms 
to denote those committed to bringing the neurosciences into conversation with psycho-
analysis; it is important to note that not all of those engaged in such conversations would 
describe themselves as neuropsychoanalytic researchers. These words are arguably most 
closely associated with the neuroscientist and psychoanalyst Mark Solms, and with the 
research published in the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis, which Solms co-founded. For a 
selection of research published elsewhere that could be described as neuropsychoanalytic, 
see: Ariane Bazan: Des fantômes dans la voix: Une Hypothèse neuropsychoanalytique sur la 
Structure de L’inconscient, Montreal 2007. Robin L. Carhart-Harris & Karl J. Friston: »The 
Default-Mode, Ego-Functions and Free-Energy: A neurobilogical Account of Freudian 
Ideas,« in: Brain, 133 (2010), 1265−1283; Robin L. Carhart-Harris et al.: »Mourning and 
Melancholia Revisited: Correspondences between Principles of Freudian Metapsychology 
and Empirical Findings in Neuropsychiatry,« in: Annals of General Psychiatry, 7 (2008); 
Mauro Mancia: Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience, New York 2006; Avi Peled: Neuroanalysis: 
Bridging the Gap between Neuroscience, Psychoanalysis, and Psychiatry, Hove 2008.
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how Freudian concepts might be anchored through neurobiological and 
anatomico-functional investigations.6
For the purposes of this chapter, we confi ne ourselves to discussions 
taking place within the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis, and in associated 
publications by some of its most prominent contributors. Neuro-Psycho-
analysis has been a key mouthpiece of the fi eld since its establishment in 
1999. Neuro-Psychoanalysis, as the introduction in the fi rst issue by editors 
Edward Nersessian and Mark Solms makes clear, assumes an underlying 
›unity of purpose‹ between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Indeed, 
Solms and Nersessian use a quotation from Freud’s The Interpretation 
of Dreams to present this purpose as the rendering intelligible of »the 
complications of mental functioning,« which would proceed through 
a dissection of that functioning and an assignation of »diﬀ erent con-
stituents to diﬀ erent component parts of the apparatus«.7 Researchers 
at the forefront of the neuropsychoanalytic project are convinced that 
neuroscience and psychoanalysis »are ultimately pursuing the same 
task«: while they are understood to have approached this task »from 
radically diﬀ erent perspectives,« there is, these researchers argue, the 
possibility of »consilience«.8 Our argument proceeds by investigating 
how neuropsychoanalysts conceptualize the »complications of mental 
functioning« with a view to producing such consilience.
We focus here on neuropsychoanalytic discussions of the drive (Trieb). 
The drive is, of course, one of the most central terms in Freud’s writings, 
as it represents the fundamental force animating the psychic apparatus. 
The drive was also the focus of extensive discussion in the fi rst few issues 
of the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis, and has been so again periodically 
6 Carhart-Harris & Friston, for example, discuss the importance of »explor[ing] the no-
tion that Freudian constructs may have real neurobiological substrates« (»The Default-Mode, 
Ego-Functions and Free-Energy,« note 5). Mauro Mancia argues that the new conversa-
tions between neuroscience and psychoanalysis are »intended to produce experimental 
data to amplify basic psychoanalytical concepts and give them anatomical-functional 
consistency in the attempt, already theorized by Freud, of one day being able to explain 
the mind … in scientific terms as close as possible to those used in chemistry, physics 
and biology« (Carhart-Harris & Friston: »The Default-Mode, Ego-Functions and Free-
Energy,« [note 5], p. 1265; Mancia: Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience, [note 5], p. 2).
7 Sigmund Freud: »Interpretation of Dreams,« in: The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. By James Strachey, London 1900.
8 These quotations are from Nersessian & Solm’s ›Editors’ introduction‹ to the first issue 
of the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis (Nersessian and Solms: »Editors’ Introduction,« [note 
4], p. 3). The editors specify that the journal »will publish unsolicited original articles 
on any topic that can facilitate consilience between psychoanalysis and neuroscience« 
(p. 3). The title of Jaak Panksepp’s article in the first issue is Jaak Panksepp: »Emotions 
as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: An Exercise in Consilience,« in: Neuro-
Psychoanalysis, 1 (1999), 15−38. The term ›consilience‹ is most obviously associated with 
E. O. Wilson (Edward O. Wilson: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, New York 1998).
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since. The writings on which we focus att empt to meld a particular set 
of Freudian formulations with experimental data and concepts drawn 
from a range of neuroscientifi c and allied disciplines. We argue that in 
doing so, the writings are committ ed to submitt ing both the norma-
tive workings of the psyche and the neurobiological systems that may 
correlate with such workings to the function of self-preservation. This 
overarching commitment, we claim, shadows and determines both 
neuropsychoanalytic readings of Freud’s texts, as well as neuropsycho-
analytic researchers’ discussion of neurobiological fi ndings.
Our argument moves from a consideration of the place of the drive 
in psychoanalysis to an elaboration of some of the recent neuropsycho-
analytic att empts to pin down the drive. We subsequently turn briefl y to 
the writings of psychoanalyst and philosopher Jean Laplanche, whose 
own readings and recastings of the Freudian oeuvre centrally engage the 
question of the drive. Laplanche provides an exemplary counterpoint 
to the neuropsychoanalytic writings, in so far as he is preoccupied with 
untethering the drive – and, through it, the psychic apparatus – from 
self-preservation. Laplanche acknowledges that Freud’s writings on the 
drive do indeed frequently engage the register of self-preservation – and 
manifest a frequent recourse to a language of ›function‹ and ›need‹. 
Through careful readings of the Freudian corpus, he argues, however, 
that the key discovery of psychoanalysis, that of the vicissitudes of hu-
man sexuality, perverts the register of self-preservation. For Laplanche, 
»it is sexuality which represents the model of every drive and probably consti-
tutes the only drive in the strict sense of the term«9; any formulation of the 
drive that in some ways cleaves to psychoanalysis must, on Laplanche’s 
account, therefore contend with the vicissitudes of human sexuality and 
the perversion of ›function‹ that it subtends. In the course of the chapter, 
we focus on the neuropsychoanalytic investment in self-preservation 
in order to refl ect on how guiding assumptions (whether explicit or 
implicit) underpin the approaches that those from diﬀ erent disciplines 
and epistemological starting points take to reading Freud. In so doing, 
we indicate how such guiding assumptions shadow neuropsychoana-
lytic claims that there might be »a unity of purpose« between the two 
»historically divided disciplines,« and pose dangers as well as openings 
for interdisciplinary projects such as neuropsychoanalysis.
9 Jean Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, translated by Jeffrey Mehlmann, Balti-
more 1976, p. 8.
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The drive in psychoanalysis
Our choice of focus on the drive as it is discussed in neuropsychoana-
lytic writings is motivated in at least three ways. First, and centrally, 
the drive is not only a central concept in Freud’s work but one that 
articulates the passage between the somatic and the psychic. Freud 
claims that the concept of the drive is located »on the frontier between 
the mental and the somatic«,10 and in this sense the concept itself em-
bodies the question of the relation between what are posited as two 
distinct domains. As such, ›drive‹ invokes a problematic that is also 
central within neuropsychoanalysis. Secondly, Freud’s drive theory is 
characterised by a remarkable volatility. On the one hand, Freud was 
centrally preoccupied with conceptualizing the fundamental forces or 
impulses that drive the human subject across the span of his work.11 At 
the same time, however, the precise number and dynamics of such forces 
and their relation to the body’s biological needs underwent consider-
able recastings in Freud’s writings. Freud, in his fi rst elaboration of the 
drive (Trieb)12 in 1905, set up a distinction between a sexual force (libido) 
and biological needs (for example, the need for nourishment); he later 
recast this distinction as an antagonism between sexual drives and self-
preservative or ego-drives (around 1910); fi nally, he installed the more 
›mythic‹ opposition between the life and death drives, supplemented 
by their composites, in 1920.13 Thirdly, in so far as the drive marks the 
space of a quasi-biological foundation of the psyche, it has become 
10 Sigmund Freud: »Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,« in: The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. By James Strachey, London 1915, p. 122.
11 Starting with his posthumously published »A Project for a Scientific Psychology«. 
(Sigmund Freud: »A Project for a Scientific Psychology,« in: The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, London 1950, 
281−391.) Here, Freud discusses the organisms’s subjection to two kinds of excitation 
(Reiz).
12 In what follows, we refer to ›drive‹ in the singular, when discussing Freud’s drive theory. 
Freud of course talked about a conflict between drives in some of his work. In choosing 
the singular in our discussion of Freud’s work, we do not wish to point to the drive as 
a homogeneous force, but rather refer to drive as a dimension which signals the passage 
from the somatic to the psychic. In this chapter we also refer to components of the drive, 
and will retain the term in the singular or plural as it appears within neuropsychoanalytic 
writings.
13 Sigmund Freud: »Beyond the Pleasure Principle,« in: The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, London 1920, 1−64; Sigmund 
Freud: »The Psycho-Analytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision,« in: The Stan-
dard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, 
London 1910, 211−218; Sigmund Freud: »Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,« in: 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James 
Strachey, London 1905, 123−246.
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something of a scandalous concept within contemporary psychoanaly-
sis. As Mark Solms and Oliver Turnbull, in their 2002 monograph The 
Brain and the Inner World, note in an amusing understatement, the drive 
»seems to be unfashionable in psychoanalysis nowadays,« even though 
»[i]t is unclear why this happened«.14 Before moving any further, we 
shall briefl y consider this fall from grace of the drive, since the terms of 
this psychoanalytic rejection may illuminate the terms of what we have 
called the drive’s rehabilitation in neuropsychoanalysis.
Indeed, many contemporary psychoanalytic traditions have estab-
lished their domain through an abandonment of the drive as a crude 
or unnecessary concept. Generally, drive theory has been read as the 
clearest expression of Freud’s adherence to Helmholtz’s physiological re-
search, that is, to what is commonly regarded as an outdated mechanistic 
model of the psychic apparatus as a thermodynamic system.15 Addition-
ally, the drive has been denounced as a representative of a speculative 
wilderness encroaching on Freud’s writings and therefore turning them 
away from observable, clinical facts.16 (While this assessment most fre-
quently arises in relation to the death drive, it is signifi cantly buoyed 
by Freud’s own claim that drive theory is »our mythology«.)17 Finally, 
the rejection of the drive has corresponded with many contemporary 
psychoanalysts’ rethinking of psychic space through object relations 
and intersubjective engagements, and their seeking to minimise the 
determinism of endogenous forces in the production of that space.18
There is, however, an additional dimension to this post-Freudian 
rejection of the drive, which demands our att ention insofar as this 
dimension becomes central to neuropsychoanalytic discussions of the 
drive. A substantial impetus for psychoanalysts’ rejection of Freudian 
drive theory is drawn from the wide acceptance of John Bowlby’s claims 
14 Mark Solms & Oliver Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, New York 2002, p. 117.
15 See, for example, Arnold Modell: »The Concept of Psychic Energy,« in: Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, 11 (1963), 605−618; Joseph Sandler et al.: Freud’s 
Models of the Mind: An Introduction, London 1997, p. 74.
16 See, for example, Leopoldo Fulgencio: »Winnicott’s Rejection of the basic Concepts of 
Freud’s Metapsychology,« in: International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 88 (2007), 443−461; 
Daniel N. Stern: Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Develop-
mental Psychology, New York 1985.
17 Sigmund Freud: »New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,« in: The Standard Edi-
tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James Strachey, London 
1933, p. 95.
18 Stephen A. Mitchell: Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis: An Integration, Cambridge 
1988; Tehodore Shapiro & Robert N. Emde: Affect: Psychoanalytic Perspectives, Madison 
1993; Charles Spezzano: Affect in Psychoanalysis: A Clinical Synthesis, Hillsdale et al. 1993; 
Robert D. Stolorow: »The Intersubjective Context of Intrapsychic Experience: A Decade 
of Psychoanalytic Inquiry,« in: Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 11 (1991), 171−184.
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regarding the importance of att achment between infant and carer in 
the production of psychic space.19 Here, what is being rejected is not 
the biological as such, but rather Freud’s insistence on the foundational 
place of libido in his drive theory. Bowlby, in his work with deprived 
children, had come to emphasise the importance of att achment for child 
development,20 and vociferously to reject Freud’s insistence that such 
development should be understood primarily through the vicissitudes 
of infantile sexuality. Notably, Bowlby framed his rejection of the pri-
macy of libidinal drive as a rejection of the drive tout court, in so far 
as he defi ned att achment as a behavioural system, a concept borrowed 
from ethology. A behavioural system is »a species-universal neural pro-
gram that organizes an individual’s behavior in ways that increase the 
likelihood of survival«.21 Bowlby and att achment theorists, in replacing 
drive with behavioural systems, thereby construct a new foundation 
for psychic space, in which this space emerges under the auspices of 
self-preservation, fi tt ed towards survival.
In sum, we see the drive being rejected as too biologistic and not 
scientifi c enough, charged with introducing a sham biology, a biolog-ism 
within the psyche. At the same time, and under the gravitational pull of 
att achment theory, this rejection of ›sham biology‹ is also a rejection of 
Freud’s emphasis on the libidinal foundations of the psyche. Here, drive 
theory, in its various recastings across Freud’s own writings, becomes a 
placeholder not only for what Freud referred to as ›the biological‹ but 
also for the primacy of the sexual in the psychic apparatus. Seen in this 
way, we would suggest that the rejection of the drive in contemporary 
psychoanalysis is not so much a refusal of the biological within the psy-
chic but rather a refusal of what we might term Freud’s ›con-fi guration‹ 
of the biological as the sexual in particular. It is our contention in this 
chapter that while much of contemporary psychoanalysis refuses this 
con-fi guration and ejects drive theory altogether, neuropsychoanalysis 
strives to gather and to streamline both Freud’s ›biologism‹ and his em-
phasis on the primacy of the sexual under the aegis of self-preservation, 
as the evolutionarily driven function of the psyche. In what follows, we 
consider some of the referential strategies through which such stream-
lining or normalization has been att empted to date.
19 John Bowlby: Attachment and Loss, Vol. 1 London 1969.
20 World Health Organization: »Maternal Care and Mental Health: A Report Prepared on 
Behalf of the World Health Organization by John Bowlby,« Geneva 1951.
21 Mario Mikulincer: »Attachment, Caregiving, and Sex within Romantic Relationships: A 
Behavioral Systems Perspective,« in: Dynamics of Romantic Love: Attachment, Caregiving, 
and Sex, ed. by Mario Mikulincer et al., New York 2006, 23−44, here p. 24.
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The drive in neuropsychoanalysis
»Drive is the most ›biological‹ or embodied side of the mind …«22
The emphasis on the drive is important for the project of neuropsy-
choanalysis, insofar as this project seeks to articulate psychoanalysis 
together with an aﬀ ective neuroscience and with data gathered from 
animal models, thus challenging what is seen as a dominant cognitiv-
ist and human-centred bias in neuroscience as a whole.23 Within many 
neuropsychoanalytic writings, references to the Freudian drive theory 
supports an understanding of human motivation and action based on 
the sub-cortical and therefore non-cognitive functions of the brain. The 
drives (pluralised) are seen to mobilise the »perceptual world of the id«, 
an archaic foundation to the mental apparatus, or a »primary aﬀ ective 
consciousness« that engages the representation of visceral states.24 In this 
context, an emphasis on drive theory also restores the link between »the 
psychoanalytic understanding of the human mind« and »knowledge 
derived from all other animals«.25
Any importation of the drive theory into neuropsychoanalysis there-
fore needs to negotiate the latt er’s emerging neurobiological lingua 
franca, which is primarily based on the work of psychobiologist and 
neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp, specifi cally his formulation of Emotional 
Command Systems (ECSs), as established in his 1998 work Aﬀ ective 
Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions.26 Panksepp’s 
work posits several distinct »›emotional command systems‹ that instigate 
and orchestrate the diverse aspects of emotionality within the human 
brain«.27 Importantly, these ECSs represent evolutionarily prepared 
biological values that safeguard survival. The more basic of these sys-
tems are located within what are known as the paleocortical parts of the 
22 Yoram Yovell: »Is There a Drive to Love?,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 10 (2008), 117−144, 
here p. 118.
23 Neuropsychoanalysis is indebted and committed to research on the neurobiology of 
emotion, particularly – as we shall show – to research by Jaak Panksepp. The journal 
Neuro-Psychoanalysis has published several contributions by Panksepp, and its first issue 
featured commentaries by two of the other most prominent researchers currently investi-
gating emotion; Antonio Damasio and Joseph LeDoux (Antonio Damasio: »Commentary 
by Antonio R. Damasio,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 (1999), 38−39; Joseph LeDoux: »Psy-
choanalytic Theory: Clues from the Brain,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 (1999), 44−49.
24 Mark Solms & Edward Nersessian: »Concluding Remarks,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 
(1999), 91−96, here p. 93.
25 Solms & Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, (note 14), p. 117.
26 Jaak Panksepp: Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions, 
New York et al. 1998.
27 Panksep: »Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience«, (note 8), p. 18.
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brain, which are the regions including and immediately surrounding the 
brain stem shared by all vertebrate life. Neurochemical activity across 
these regions is said to generate exploratory and mating behaviour as 
well as fi ght or fl ight responses, and this activity is codifi ed as distinct 
yet interlocking ECSs, which Panksepp calls SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, 
LUST. The remaining systems are positioned ›higher up‹ in evolutionary 
terms, in the sub-cortical regions shared by all mammals – these gener-
ate proto-social sequences related to separation anxiety, social bonding, 
and rough and tumble (Panksepp’s PANIC, CARE and PLAY). While 
for Panksepp the expression of subjective feeling involves a complex 
and variegated interaction across these systems and the so-called higher 
cerebral processes, there is, nevertheless, nothing specifi cally human 
about the ECSs themselves and therefore about the basic architecture 
of subjective experience. Crucially, Panksepp acknowledges that while 
these systems are all set up to safeguard the organism by fulfi lling its 
biological needs, their distinctiveness (through diﬀ erent neurochemical 
signatures, anatomical pathways and phenomenological expression), 
considerably complicates the possibility of such fulfi lment. It is on this 
complex and heterogeneous neuronal fi eld that neuropsychoanalysts 
att empt to map Freudian drive theory.
Signifi cantly, Panksepp himself clearly articulates the diﬃ  culty with 
mapping drive theory on to the subcortical emotion systems of the 
brain. The fi rst issue of Neuro-Psychoanalysis hosts a dialogue between 
Panksepp, the journal’s editors Edward Nersessian and Mark Solms, 
and several contributors, in which Panksepp insists that by att empting 
to fi nd neuronal correlates for the Freudian drive, neuropsychoanalysts 
are engaging in a fundamentally futile task. While Panksepp initially 
sketches several possible mappings of the drive, he fi nally claims that 
drive theory cannot subsist with the data of current neuropsychology, 
because Freud’s conception of a global motivational force (libido) or 
a binary of such forces (ego-drives and sex-drives) are not consistent 
with the plurality and heterogeneity of the ECSs.28 Despite Panksepp’s 
considerable and ongoing reservations, however, the drive concept 
continues to be extensively discussed.
Indeed, from the very fi rst article published in the journal Neuro-
Psychoanalysis, Mark Solms and his colleagues are preoccupied with 
precisely such a mapping. To this end, they seize upon what will become 
a favoured and frequently cited defi nition of the drive from Freud’s 
1915 essay »Instincts and their vicissitudes«, where ›drive‹ refers to: 
28 Ibid. p. 27.
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»the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within 
the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand 
made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with 
the body«.29 This is the baseline referencing point both in Solms and 
Nersessian’s opening salvo in the journal, as well as in numerous articles 
that discuss what they call Freud’s theory of »motivation« in relation to 
neuropsychological fi ndings.30 However, Solms and Nersessian precede 
their citation of passage from Freud with a very particular gloss on the 
psychoanalytic project:
According to Freud, the mental apparatus as a whole serves the biological 
purpose of meeting the imperative internal needs of the subject in a changing 
(…) external environment. These needs are expressed through »drives«: quan-
titative demands on the mental apparatus to perform work (i. e. to bring about 
the specifi c changes that are necessary to relieve current internal needs).31
A number of things happen here. Right from the beginning, drive is 
defi ned as »quantitative demands,« in other words as pressure or an 
undiﬀ erentiated arousal (it is thus separable from the qualitative aspects 
of such demands, that is, from the experienced emotions as such). In 
addition, drive is submitt ed to an overarching function, the »biologi-
cal purpose« of the mental apparatus as a whole to »meet« needs; in 
other words, it is conceived in terms of an overarching self-preservative 
purpose.32 Furthermore, this submission is posited as Freud’s own (»ac-
cording to Freud«).33 In so far as drive is enlisted as a self-preservative 
function, it is pluralized and, under the auspices of self-preservation, 
29 Freud: »Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,« (note 10), p. 7.
30 This quotation is used not only by Solms and Turnbull but by others publishing in 
Neuro-Psychoanalysis in their discussions of the Freudian drive.
31 Mark Solms & Edward Nersessian: »Freud’s Theory of Affect: Questions for Neurosci-
ence,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 (1999), 5−14, here p. 5.
32 This paper by Solms and Nersessian also describes the »evolutionary ›why?‹ »of affect 
as the assigning of value to the state of the mental apparatus, a process that is »an 
innate mechanism crucial for reproductive survival« (p. 5). Elsewhere, Solms (in col-
laboration with Oliver Turnbull) states that: »Freud argued that the unconscious mind 
was dominated by unconstrained instinctual mechanisms – which in turn revealed the 
fundamentally biological nature of human mental life. Thus humans, no less than other 
living creatures, are animals: driven by evolutionarily conserved drives.« (Turnbull & 
Solms: »Awareness, Desire and False Beliefs,« [note 1], p. 1084) These formulations 
provide further evidence of Solms and other neuropsychoanalysts’ commitment to 
conceptualizing the psychical apparatus in its entirety as under the yoke of biological, 
evolutionary pressures.
33 Indeed the psychoanalyst André Green, who was one of the commentators for Solms 
and Nersessian’s article, vigorously refuted the legitimacy of this reference to Freud, 
arguing that »the task of meeting the imperative internal needs is that of the ego« and 
not the »mental apparatus« as a whole (André Green: »Consilience and Rigour: Com-
mentary by André Green,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 1 [1999], 40−44, here p. 41).
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rendered compatible with the bio-evolutionary terrain of the ECSs, while 
at the same time, made analytically distinct from the latt er. From the be-
ginning then, an alignment of drive with an overarching self-preservative 
function is not only posited as a Freudian claim; it is in addition defi ned 
as the challenge to be met through a gathering of the evidence accruing 
from the various local experimental fi ndings on the workings of the 
ECSs. As a result, and throughout numerous neuropsychoanalytic texts, 
drive is imagined and re-imagined as »motivations«, which, while not 
strictly localisable, nevertheless both coincide with and yet disarticulate 
the chemical and anatomical distinctiveness of the ECSs.
Solms’ and Turnbull’s The Brain and the Inner World constitutes a more 
sustained att empt to meet Panksepp’s reservations about drive theory. 
Here, the Freudian drive is immediately qualifi ed as ›appetitive‹ in an 
adaptive correction of Freud’s narrow ›libidinal‹ emphasis: Solms and 
Turnbull state in a footnote that, »[w]here Freud used the sexual term 
›libido‹ to denote the mental function activated by our bodily needs of 
all kinds, modern neurobiologists speak of ›appetites‹.«34 This particular 
manoeuvre appears to render the drive concept compatible with a more 
generalized repertory of biological needs addressed by the ECSs. For 
Solms and Turnbull, neurobiological fi ndings necessitate this correction: 
in the complex neurochemical terrain of brain systems, a single drive 
as motivating force has strictly speaking no precise equivalent if such 
drive is qualifi ed as a libidinal force. This is because the ECSs address 
diﬀ erent types of needs (the only approximation to a libidinal dimen-
sion would be Panksepp’s LUST system, but LUST activates specifi c 
mating behaviour, narrowly understood). Instead, ›drive‹ for Solms and 
Turnbull comes to signify initially the mental readout of diﬀ erent bodily 
needs. In this sense, ›drive‹ is, once again, conceptualized as a purely 
quantitative measure; it is a kind of proto-registration of homeostatic 
imbalances, before these imbalances become qualifi ed as distinct feel-
ings of arousal (including sexual arousal, as one type of arousal among 
others).35 In The Brain and the Inner World, as in most neuropsychoanalytic 
texts that follow, this qualifi cation of drive as an ›appetitive‹ function, 
allows the Freudian concept to disperse across diﬀ erent levels of brain 
complexity, which then become its components: ›drive‹ is envisaged as 
surging from the brain stem’s homeostatic need regulators and works 
through Panksepp’s SEEKING system, a dopamine-activated system that 
34 Interestingly, this corrective gesture aligns the Freudian libido with that of Jung’s concept 
of ›undifferentiated energy,‹ and in so doing effectively erases the significant dispute 
between Freud and Jung regarding the drive.
35 Solms & Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, (note 14), p. 118.
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initiates exploratory, purposeful behaviour.36 Unlike the case of other 
ECSs, the activation of SEEKING is not att ached to the experience of 
a specifi c emotional tonality: rather, SEEKING activation generates the 
felt experience of anticipation and diﬀ use craving, and, as such, can be 
posited as a foundation for the functioning of all other ECSs.37 How-
ever, this adaptive ›correction‹ of the Freudian drive towards a more 
undiﬀ erentiated appetitive function runs into a further set of problems, 
since emerging experimental fi ndings suggest that craving urges are not 
necessarily submitt ed to the purpose of meeting biological needs.
The neuropsychoanalytic reorientation of Freudian drive theory as 
the expression of biological needs means that any non-adaptive activation 
of the SEEKING system then needs to be understood through a discourse 
of malfunction and addressed through a supplementary concept. Thus, 
when Solms and Turnbull present the neurobiological correlates of ad-
dictive behaviours, they speak of a »hĳ acking« of drive from its original 
appetitive functions to pathological, »pseudo-appetitive« ones.38 Even 
with the supplementary correction, however, the SEEKING system still 
falls short of the defi nition of the drive. Howard Shevrin (a psychologist 
with psychoanalytic and neuroscientifi c research interests) debated the 
correctness of the association that Panksepp had tentatively suggested 
vis-à-vis the drive and SEEKING in another issue of Neuro-Psycho-
analysis.39 Shevrin noted that while Panksepp’s system is »inherently 
objectless and amorphously aﬀ ective,«40 the experimental fi ndings from 
which Panksepp had drawn, in part, this concept testifi ed to the perdur-
ance of imperious cravings instigated uniquely by certain stimulants.41 
(Rats stimulated in their mesoaccumbens, dopamine-activated system 
continue to press levers even in the absence of reward and while ignor-
ing other needs – so that they go hungry and die of exhaustion unless 
36 This qualification of the drives as ›appetitive,‹ as well as their incorporation of different 
levels of brain complexity, is drawing considerable consensus. See for example: Yovell: 
»Is There a Drive to Love?,« (note 22); Maggie Zellner: »Neural Substrates of Drive 
Motivation and Cathexis,« in: New York Psychoanalytic Society. Arnold Pfeffer Center for 
Neuropsychoanalysis, New York 2009.
37 Solms & Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, (note 14), p. 117.
38 Ibid., p. 121.
39 Panksepp: »Emotions as Viewed by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience,« (note 8), p. 23; 
Howard Shevrin: »Commentary on Jaak Panksepp’s Response,« in: Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 
1 (1999), 247−250, here p. 247.
40 Shevrin: »Commentary on Jaak Panksepp’s Response,« p. 247.
41 For a review of these experimental findings on addiction, see Kent C. Berridge and 
Morten L. Kringelbach: »Affective Neuroscience of Pleasure: Reward in Humans and 
Animals,« in: Psychopharmacology, 199 (2008), 457−480.
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stopped or presented with food immediately accessible to them.)42 For 
Shevrin, that original work on addiction may be closer to approximat-
ing a Freudian drive-like force than Panksepp’s later elaboration of the 
SEEKING system. This is because, both the Freudian drive and the 
craving pangs of addiction are »specifi c to objects which can gratify 
the drive,«43 whereas in Panksepp’s model, SEEKING is objectless and 
diﬀ use. Shevrin here disputes the validity of Panksepp’s move from 
the specifi city of data on addiction to what he sees as a generalisation 
about a foundational transmammalian, hard-wired adaptive system. In 
so doing, Shevrin is also claiming that it is a certain excitability of the 
mesoaccumbens pathways rather than their submission to an assumed 
adaptive function, that can be said to bett er approximate the Freudian 
drive. In light of Shevrin’s reservations, it could be claimed that dop-
aminergic activity in the mesoaccumbens resonates more with Freud’s 
descriptions when it behaves in what Solms and Turnbull call »pseudo-
appetitive« fashion, when it serves »no biologically useful purpose.«44 
Shevrin’s intervention is signifi cant here, because it questions neither the 
validity of the experimental data, nor the legitimacy of the reference to 
Freud. Instead, it questions the emerging overarching model according 
to which addictive behaviours, to use one example, constitute a hĳ ack-
ing of the drive’s original purpose.
It is important to go further here: what does it mean in this context 
to talk, as Shevrin does, of objects capable of »gratify[ing] the drive«? 
While cocaine or amphetamines can function as such objects, what these 
substances do is not at all compatible with the Freudian account of the 
aim of the drive as it is most frequently used in neuropsychoanalytic 
texts. While in »Instincts and their Vicissitudes« Freud claimed that the 
aim of the drive is to »remov[e] the state of stimulation at the source 
of the instinct,«45 Solms and Turnbull’s interpretation of this concept 
glosses this as an aim to restore »the homeostatic mechanisms« within 
their »acceptable range«.46 In the case of the stimulated rats, by contrast, 
the hyper-excitation of their mesoaccumbens becomes an end in itself, 
and, by the same token, the addict craves cocaine not in order to stem 
this hyper-excitation, but on the contrary, in order to perpetuate it. Thus 
Shevrin’s intervention brings to light a set of implicit models around 
42 Howard Shevrin: »The Contribution of Cognitive Behavioral and Neurophysiological 
Frames of Reference to a Psychodynamic Nosology of Mental Illness.« n. d.
43 Shevrin: »Commentary on Jaak Panksepp’s Response,« (note 39), p. 247.
44 Solms & Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, (note 14), p. 122.
45 Freud: »Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,« (note 10), p. 122.
46 Solms & Turnbull: The Brain and the Inner World, (note 14), p. 118.
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self-preservation, which mobilise the meeting between Freudian drive 
theory and neuroscientifi c data.
These debates between Solms and his collaborators on the one hand, 
and Panksepp and Shevrin on the other, exemplify the trouble gener-
ated in the early att empts to position the drive as a bridge between the 
somatic and the psychic. We have argued that such positioning has 
been att empted through a series of assumptions; chief amongst these 
are an understanding of the drive as a pressure for the relief of bodily 
needs, as well as a translation of Freud’s ›libidinal‹ as ›appetitive‹. We 
have suggested that these assumptions both enable and trouble such a 
positioning of the drive. We now turn to a second moment in these at-
tempts, where something like a neuropsychoanalytic consensus may be 
emerging, in order to consider how, and with what consequences, such 
a consensus may have engaged a revision of the earlier debates.
This moment is represented by the publication in 2008 in Neuro-
Psychoanalysis of a paper by the psychoanalyst and neurobiologist Yoram 
Yovell entitled »Is there a drive to love?«47 The paper proposes a neu-
ropsychoanalytic account of romantic love and, in this context, gives an 
extensive and succinct exposition of the Freudian drive theory, as well 
as performing further corrections to this theory in light of fi ndings in 
neuroscience and developmental psychology. Here, Yovell initially af-
fi rms the positioning of Panksepp’s SEEKING system as a neurobiologi-
cal equivalent of drive »pressure,« as well as reasserts the consequent 
neuropsychoanalytic characterisation of drive as appetitive rather than 
libidinal. However, even in light of these ›corrections,‹ Yovell claims 
that there is still a considerable problem with the att empt to designate 
a certain appetitive function as the undiﬀ erentiated motivation of all 
ECSs. This is because: »these other instinctual (emotional) systems are 
not elaborations of the libidinal drive. They are not derived from it, 
each of them has evolved for its own sake, and they serve other survival 
needs. Importantly, these other instinctual  /  emotional command systems 
are absent from Freudian theory.«48
To return to the subjective experience of romantic love: Yovell con-
jectures that it is not possible to understand the diﬀ erent aspects of that 
experience without resort to further, non-appetitive motivations. Such 
a hypothesis would also be fully supported in the Pankseppian model 
of independent ECSs serving »other survival needs«. In this context, 
non-appetitive basic motivations can fi nd neurobiological equivalents in 
47 Yovell: »Is There a Drive to Love?,« (note 22). Indeed, the issue as a whole is devoted 
to the drive, with Yovell’s article as the target paper.
48 Ibid., p. 123.
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the activation of two further ECSs, PANIC and CARE, which subtend 
separation anxiety and social bonding respectively. These latt er ECSs 
are activated by neuromodulators that are distinct from and partly an-
tagonistic to those engaged in the SEEKING system.49 In light of this, 
Yovell proposes that, »drive theory may now be revised to include the 
contribution of nonlibidinal instinctual  /  emotional systems such as the 
att achment system. It may then serve as a useful link between psycho-
analysis and the cognitive and aﬀ ective neurosciences in their combined 
eﬀ orts to study and understand romantic love.«50
To produce this link, Yovell appears to have eﬀ ectively corrected 
Freud’s prioritization of the libidinal drive, as well as Bowlby’s and later 
att achment theorists’ replacement of the drive concept with that of be-
havioural systems, in light of »what we know today«51 about the relative 
autonomy of ECSs. Here, the correlation of libido with SEEKING  /  LUST 
(two ECSs working together) is supplemented by that of att achment 
with PANIC  /  CARE. However, like the earlier moment in which the 
drive made possible a bridge between disciplines, this further apparent 
consolidation of that bridge obscures a similar set of assumptions. Here, 
in particular, the Freud that requires further supplementation is a very 
specifi c neuropsychoanalytic Freud, one who has emerged through the 
establishment of equivalences between the drive and SEEKING, and 
between the libidinal and the appetitive in the fi rst place. Yovell suc-
cinctly states, »the action of the SEEKING system is the closest biologi-
cal correlate of the psychoanalytic concept of … libidinal drive … [but] 
there appears to be more in romantic love than libido«.52 What is not 
spelled out in this conclusion is the extent to which what Yovell iden-
tifi es as the »psychoanalytic concept of libidinal drive« constitutes in 
fact a very particular neuropsychoanalytic reading of a psychoanalytic 
concept. That is, the Freudian drive has been correlated to SEEKING 
only aft er having been submitt ed to the overarching assumption that 
drive is the general motivational pressure of biological needs and, as 
such, serves a specifi c evolutionary purpose. According to Yovell’s logic, 
if the hypothesis of a libidinal  /  appetitive drive alone is not suﬃ  cient to 
explain romantic love, then further non-appetitive drives also serving 
49 This distinction between appetitive and non-appetitive is based primarily on one be-
tween neurotransmitters (primarily dopamine) and neuropeptides (such as oxytocin 
and vasopressin). The former are said to mediate sexual appetite, while the latter are 
associated with bonding behaviours. See Ibid., p. 137−139. 
50 Ibid., p. 140−141. italics added.
51 Ibid., p. 128.
52 Ibid., p. 138.
204 Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard
a specifi c evolutionary purpose need to be elaborated. That is to say, 
this formulation of »more … than« – to return to Yovell’s claim »more 
in romantic love than libido« – can only mean more drives serving the 
same evolutionary purpose, rather than more to the drive than the servicing 
of this evolutionary purpose.
Yovell’s concluding remarks further elaborate on this »more … than«. 
Indeed, aft er Yovell has accounted for what he sees as the sexual and 
att achment aspects of romantic love, through reference to the working 
of the SEEKING  /  LUST and the PANIC  /  CARE systems respectively, 
he turns to a further question. This is the question of the fi xation on a 
particular object that characterises romantic love. At that point, Yovell 
brings forward fMRI animal studies to claim that some aspects of this 
fi xation are mediated by »activation of dopaminergic transmission« 
(i. e. an activation of the SEEKING system), while others are »mediated 
by the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin« (an activation of the 
CARE system). Here, the strengthening of object choice appears to work 
across partly antagonistic ECSs in ways that are not fully reducible to the 
distinct dynamics of these systems. Having hypothesised that a third 
drive enlisting the services of antagonistic dynamics may be required in 
order fully to explain romantic love, Yovell then concludes by question-
ing that very hypothesis »it is not certain that these contributions [i. e. from 
antagonistic neuromodulators] fully account for the special characteristics 
according to which the choice of the beloved is made, nor for the intensity with 
which it is maintained.«53
Here, something remains unaccounted for, despite Yovell’s readiness 
to pluralise the drive. In other words, a certain »more … than« appears 
to exceed that pluralisation. Of course, there is nothing surprising about 
such a remainder: by defi nition, the project of bringing together two 
distinct disciplinary terrains will inevitably generate such problems. 
However, rather than concluding that the presence of this remainder 
indicates the measure of the work still to be done, we would suggest 
instead that such a remainder is the eﬀ ect of a particular set of alignments 
between the sexual and the appetitive and between the drive and self-
preservation. That is to say, it is an eﬀ ect not of the encounter between 
Freud and neurobiological data as such, but rather of a certain reading of 
Freud that is already in operation to facilitate this particular encounter. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we schematically outline the stakes of 
an alternative reading of Freud, insofar as this latt er reading disturbs 
the possibility of an alignment between drive and self-preservation. 
53 Ibid., p. 139.
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This reading insists that the drive qua sexuality splits apart the model 
of the human organism as solely devoted to the tasks of homeostatic 
self-regulation and self-preservation.
Sexuality and the drive: Laplanche reads Freud
The philosopher and psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche, in an extended and 
meticulous exegesis of Freud’s oeuvre that has been conducted over the 
course of several decades, illuminates what might be at stake in the 
diﬃ  culty that neuropsychoanalytic research has in locating – and opera-
tionalizing – the drive.54 Laplanche posits that Freud’s texts themselves 
are organised around a diﬃ  culty in ›locating‹ the drive, and that they 
are characterized by repeated att empts to cover over and normalise the 
trouble that the drive marks. This trouble is for Laplanche the trouble 
posed by sexuality, which he conceptualizes as that which installs the 
psychic apparatus as parasitic upon the order of biological needs. The 
drive troubles the insistence on self-preservation, such that the psychic 
names that which exceeds the logic of self-preservation. On Laplanche’s 
account, the drive within Freud fundamentally names that which exceeds 
function.
Central to Laplanche’s endeavours is the conceptual distinction that 
he makes between the drive (Trieb) and the instinct (Instinkt). That Freud 
employs two terms – Instinkt and Trieb – indicates for Laplanche the im-
port that he placed on the drive’s diﬀ erence from those models indebted 
to behavioural patt erns.55 Laplanche at this point performs a reading 
that has something in common with that of the neuropsychoanalysts: 
for example, Solms and Nersessian claim that the drive »concern[s] the 
54 English-speaking audiences remain deprived of much of the force of this exegesis, since 
many of Laplanche’s key writings remain untranslated. Of those that have been trans-
lated, most central to the argument we are pursuing here are: Jean Laplanche: Essays 
on Otherness, London et al. 1999; Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, (note 9); 
Jean Laplanche: New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, Translated by David Macey, Oxford 
1989. 
55 Curiously, neuropsychoanalytic writings both acknowledge and do not acknowledge 
this fundamental distinction. This is most obvious in Yovell’s paper »Is there a drive to 
love?,« in which he admits that drive is a better translation of Trieb than instinct, and 
indeed cites Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis on the drive (Jean Laplanche & 
Jean-Bertrand Pontalis: The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Translated by Donald Nicholson-
Smith, New York 1973). However, Yovell then proceeds to use the term »instinct« to 
signify a component part of the drive. Indeed, for Yovell, SEEKING as instinct becomes 
the neuronal equivalent of such a component (Yovell: »Is There a Drive to Love?,« [note 
22], p. 140−141, italics added). This association of an ECS with an instinct is not specific 
to Yovell but subtends Panksepp’s model as a whole.
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mental representation of the fundamental processes of organic life«. 
However, this claim leads Solms and Nersessian to urge for a »pars-
ing of such general concepts into a range of more specifi c constructs 
which lend themselves more readily to detailed scientifi c research«.56 
This means that they map particular components of the drive across 
diﬀ erent brain systems and end up pluralizing the drive when such 
mapping can no longer justify a unifi ed concept. In their reading, diﬀ er-
ent instinctual  /  emotional systems become diﬀ erent components of the 
drive. In contrast, Laplanche argues that the concept of ›drive‹ refers to 
a sexualisation of the instinctual functions as such. Here, he makes use of 
Freud’s concept of »anaclisis« (to use Strachey’s translation) or »leaning 
on« (to use Laplanche’s favoured translation of Anlehnung), to refer to the 
relationship between the sexual drive and instinctual or self-preservative 
functions of the organism. »Leaning on« refers, on Laplanche’s account, 
to how the drive props itself on and emerges from »those vital func-
tions which furnish [it] with an organic source, an orientation and an 
object«.57 Laplanche contends that Freud’s concept of drive establishes a 
radical disarticulation of the register of self-preservation (the satisfaction 
of vital needs). Instincts (such as the vital need of hunger as well as of 
att achment) are indeed to be conceptualized as preformed behavioural 
patt erns that are more or less adapted to certain types of objects and 
have certain clearly defi nable aims associated with homeostasis. But 
understanding the vicissitudes of the drive – its source (…) orientation 
and (…) object« – requires a diﬀ erent register from that of the behav-
ioural systems. This for Laplanche is the register of sexuality, which 
performs what he terms a radical »dehiscence« (or splitt ing asunder) 
of those vital functions.58 Here, as in Freud, sexuality does not signify 
an urge to reproduce, but rather refers to »a whole range of excitations 
and activities which may be observed from infancy onwards, and which 
procure a pleasure that cannot be adequately explained in terms of the 
satisfaction of a basic physiological need.«59
The drive as constituted through dehiscence is most visible in the 
divergence between the objects of the vital order  /  behavioural systems 
(which are objects of need) and the object of the drive (which then gives 
rise to desire). While the objects of the drive appear at fi rst glance to 
shadow those of the instinct, the latt er are in fact fundamentally re-in-
vested and thus recast as erotogenic objects, that is, as objects that aﬀ ord 
56 Solms & Nersessian: »Concluding Remarks,« (note 24), p. 94.
57 Laplanche & Pontalis: The Language of Psycho-Analysis, (note 55), p. 29.
58 Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, (note 9), p. 25.
59 Laplanche and Pontalis: The Language of Psycho-Analysis, (note 55), p. 418.
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a certain kind of arousal. The prototypical example of this is the breast: 
while the breast as nourishment – in its provision of milk – satisfi es hun-
ger, the contact between breast and mouth generates excitement.60 Here, 
craving for this arousal – sensual sucking – re-invests the appetite for 
milk and nourishment. In this reading, the drive inhabits and perverts the 
functional systems. As Laplanche puts it, the source of the drive is the 
instinct in its entirety: »The entire instinct with its own ›source‹, ›impe-
tus‹, ›aim‹, and ›object‹, […]; the instinct, kit and caboodle with its four 
factors, is in turn the source of a process which mimics, displaces, and 
denatures it: the drive.‹61 Consider, in this context, Solms and Turnbull’s 
distinction between the appetitive and the pseudo-appetitive: the latt er 
relates to occasions (such as addictions) when the activation of SEEKING 
»serves no biologically useful functions«. While for Solms and Turnbull 
an activity outside the realm of self-preservation constitutes a pathologi-
cal development, for Laplanche, such activity actually instantiates the 
sexual drive: indeed, the drive is the denaturing of vital needs as such.
Laplanche’s work is particularly engaged with the relationship 
between the drive and the early bonds between carer and infant. He 
reads Freud’s elaboration of infantile sexuality emerging out of such 
gestures and objects of care not simply as a tale of derivation (sexual-
ity is derived from a more primal caring) nor as one of developmental 
distinction (sexuality is diﬀ erent from and is activated independently 
of caring), but rather as one of perversion (sexuality is a parasitic rein-
vestment of the gestures of caring).62 He claims that for Freud sexual 
life is »graft ed on to […] a relational life [that is][…] characterized in 
terms of self-preservative instincts or in terms of need«.63 We may be 
reminded here of Yovell’s suggestion that the peculiar att raction to the 
object, which he sees as characteristic of the state of romantic love, can-
not be fully accounted for by a pluralisation of drive and the enlisting 
of distinct, even antagonistic behavioural systems, because it somehow 
60 Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, (note 9), p. 15−22.
61 Ibid., p. 22.
62 See the first two chapters, »The Order of Life and the Genesis of Human Sexuality« and 
»Sexuality and the Vital Order in Psychical Conflict« of Ibid. In Laplanche’s later writ-
ings, he elaborates on these formulations in his general theory of »primal seduction«: 
the other’s – care giver’s – gestures and words carry unconscious sexual messages, and 
implant what Laplanche calls »enigmatic signifiers« into the primitive body-ego of the 
infant. These signifiers in turn are conceptualized as the source-objects of the drive. 
Laplanche thereby significantly departs from a conception of the drive’s ›source‹ as an 
endogenously rooted biological stimulus (the conception used within neuropsychoanaly-
sis) to one that is infected by the inciting remnants of the other’s gestures (see Laplanche: 
Essays on Otherness).
63 Laplanche: New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, (note 54), p. 72.
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exceeds these. Yovell makes these claims under the overarching as-
sumption that romantic love, in its psychobiological dimensions, must 
be folded back to the order of self-preservation. Laplanche, by contrast 
would suggest that romantic love, insofar as it is potentiated through 
the vicissitudes of the drive, exceeds that order. Here, desire towards 
the love-object exceeds both the reproductive urges and aﬀ ectionate 
bonds which may be present: for Laplanche, this would be because 
desire emerges as a re-investment of original objects of vital needs and 
thus constitutes them as an excessive dimension of such objects. Just as 
the breast concretises the arousing aspects of feeding, and acts as the 
initial focus of incorporative fantasies, so other arousals emerge (per-
versely) from the gestures of care and bonding. The object of the drive 
is thus subject to a very peculiar sort of contingency: it emerges via the 
object of need, but while it does not coincide with that object neither is 
it entirely separable from it. In this sense, the object of the drive does 
not exist in itself, but rather both is, and is not, the object of need: it is 
precisely »more … than« that object.
What bearing might these formulations have on the neuropsycho-
analytic project? Laplanche argues that this logic of the sexual drive 
as that which marks a dehiscence of the register of self-preservation is 
perpetually in danger of being covered over by subsequent psychoana-
lytic traditions, as it was indeed in many of Freud’s own texts. And this, 
Laplanche maintains, was because of Freud’s frequent dependence on a 
biological theory of the drive, a theory held captive by an adaptive logic 
that returns the psychic apparatus to the demands of homoeostasis and 
self-regulation. It is a similar adaptive logic that we see played out in 
the discussions of the emerging neuropsychoanalytic consensus: here, 
the privileged text upon which the neuropsychoanalysts tend to draw is 
»Instincts and their Vicissitudes,« a text that Laplanche has characterized 
as one in which the drive appears assimilable to »an analysis which is 
also valid for so-called instinctual patt erns of behavior«.64 If we follow 
Laplanche’s claim that Freud resorted to a certain adaptive logic (which 
he named »biology«) as a way to domesticate and render familiar the 
object of psychoanalysis (sexuality), then we might argue that neurop-
sychoanalysts, in resorting to a similar adaptive logic (which directs 
their interpretation of neurobiological data), may also be performing a 
similar domestication.
64 Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, (note 9), p. 13.
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Reading Freud
In the brief for the conference »Freud’s References,« out of which this 
book emerged, Gerhard Scharbert and Christine Kirchhoﬀ  asked, »What 
happens to Freudian concepts when they are referenced? To what extent 
do they change? To what extent do the references made to Freud diﬀ er«? 
We have argued that the neuropsychoanalytic project tends towards a 
particular interpretation of Freud – and have intimated that it favours 
particular citations from Freud’s body of work. (We have noted, in 
particular, the frequent invocation of a quotation from »Instincts and 
their vicissitudes« regarding the drive as »a measure of the demand 
made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the 
body«.) This is in itself an unsurprising – and perhaps inevitable – fi nd-
ing, given that every turn, or re-turn, to Freud animates a distinctive 
network of references, associations and interpretations that relate to 
the rich Freudian oeuvre. In this sense, one could justifi ably argue that 
Laplanche, too, proceeds by endowing particular Freudian texts (such 
as the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality) with greater interpretative 
valence than others. But we want to go further. Specifi cally, we wish to 
argue that those embedded in diﬀ erent disciplinary domains tend to 
read diﬀ erently, though interdisciplinary endeavours frequently appear 
not to dwell on the potential implications that these diﬀ ering practices of 
reading might have on the constitution and character of the new fi eld.65 
We contend that Solms and Laplanche – to take two examples – dif-
fer not only in their selections from the Freudian corpus and in their 
interpretation of particular concepts within the Freudian oeuvre. More 
fundamentally, they proceed very diﬀ erently in how they relate parts 
to whole; how they negotiate the relationship between Freud’s devel-
opment of terminology and the very ›objects‹ of psychoanalysis; and 
how they respond to the various registers – examples of which might 
loosely be described as empirical, scientifi c, speculative, fi gurative and 
aesthetic – that characterize Freud’s writing. While we cannot adequately 
address these diﬀ erences here, we would suggest that while Solms 
pursues what we might describe as a ›pragmatic‹ practice of reading, 
Laplanche explicitly performs a structural reading of Freud’s oeuvre.
65 This is a problematic that we have also addressed in an overlapping field – that of re-
search in the humanities and social sciences that engages scientific research on ›affect‹; 
see Constantina Papoulias & Felicity Callard: »Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to 
Affect,« in: Body & Society, 16 (2010), 29−56.
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How, then, does Laplanche read Freud? Jeﬀ rey Mehlman, in his intro-
duction to his translation of Laplanche’s Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, 
memorably characterized Laplanche’s monograph as »an exemplary act 
of reading«: Laplanche, through »temporarily suspending the question 
of empirical reference in favor of considerations of structure« has, Me-
hlman argues, »given us nothing less than a poetics of Freud’s work«.66 
Central to Mehlman’s argument is that »the poetic« lies at the very 
heart of that work, rather than fl oating above it as a stylistic fl ourish. 
Indeed, he argues that »until we grasp the poetics of Freud’s work, the 
general economy of that work – i. e., its ultimate import – will escape 
us«.67 It is only through such att ention to structure that Laplanche is 
able to elucidate what the very ›object‹ and specifi city of psychoanalysis 
might be – as distinct, say, from the adjacent fi eld of child psychology. 
Mehlman’s laudatory endorsement of Laplanche’s »exemplary act of 
reading« oﬀ ers a signifi cant provocation to empirical (neuro)scientifi c 
fi elds that would not usually characterize themselves as in the business 
of articulating a »poetics«. Indeed, many neuropsychoanalysts, when 
reading Freud, appear to be drawn to the possibility of amplifying or 
updating in Freud those moments that might extend psychoanalysis 
towards another discipline – biology.
How do neuropsychoanalysts read Freud? What is arguably most 
pressing for empirical neuropsychoanalytic researchers is to submit 
what they term Freud’s »hypotheses about the global architecture of 
the mind«68 to scientifi c investigation, while att ending to how such 
hypotheses – and the fi ndings associated with them – compare with 
other hypotheses and other fi ndings currently under discussion within 
the mind-brain sciences. There is undoubtedly a generative character 
to scientifi c investigation: the hope that fi ndings from diﬀ erent scien-
tists and diﬀ erent sites might be compared, as well as the pragmatism, 
frequently demanded by the design of experiments and the need to 
operationalize scientifi c concepts, generate an impetus for bringing 
diﬀ erent theories and conceptual models into conversation with one 
66 Jeffrey Mehlman: »Translator’s Introduction,« in: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis (note 
9), vii–x, here p. vii.
67 Ibid. We are unable to address here how Laplanche’s argument in Life and Death in Psy-
choanalysis mobilizes an elegant and complex use of the linguistic concepts of metaphor 
and metonymy (which are of course fundamental to any conception of ›poetics‹) in order 
to explore how psychoanalytic concepts – and indeed psychical ›entities‹ themselves 
(such as drive, ego, trauma) – are derived by the extension of concepts from contiguous 
domains (metonymy), or by their transposition from other, different fields that are analo-
gously structured (metaphor). For Laplanche, the drive is a ›metaphorico-metonymical 
»derivative« of the instinct‹ (Laplanche: Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, p. 125).
68 Turnbull & Solms: »Awareness, Desire and False Beliefs« (note 1), p. 1083.
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another. These theories and conceptual models might use the same 
words to describe particular constructs, but it is quite possible that the 
scientifi c objects those words are describing are not identical. Traces of 
this can be found in instances where neuropsychoanalytic texts embed 
constructs and models from non-psychoanalytic research in their refer-
ences to Freud; or where Freudian concepts are imaginatively reworked 
in the service of translatability into other fi elds. Solms and Nersessian, 
for example, insert the concept of the »basic emotions« into some of their 
quotations of Freud,69 and in so doing bypass the substantial divergence 
between accounts of the basic emotions and Freud’s own formulations 
regarding aﬀ ect.70 Panksepp creates the neologism ›id energies‹ as a 
global placeholder for distinct neurochemical activities in the sub-cortical 
regions of the brain.71
Such acts cover from view how Freud is thereby made consonant 
with a model of the organism that is centred around adaptive need. 
Thus while such neuropsychoanalytic practices of reading and referenc-
ing are undoubtedly creative in their elaboration of a ›new‹ Freud, we 
would suggest that such creativity is held back through being tethered 
to questions of function and self-preservation. Freud is read in a manner 
that renders his writings not too strange for the terrain of the neurosci-
ences; hence the purpose of the reading is arguably to consolidate the 
familiarity of this terrain rather than radically to destabilize it. It remains 
an open question how signifi cantly an engagement with psychoanalytic 
texts might push many neuroscientifi c researchers to think diﬀ erently 
about the practices, experimental paradigms and the very ›style of 
thought‹ pursued by the neurosciences.72 What we see is a downplay-
69 Solms and Nersessian here use a Pankseppian term – ›basic emotion‹ – in their exegesis 
of what Freud ›believed‹: ›Freud believed that fixed patterns of affective motor discharge 
are, for the most part, innately prewired, although some basic emotions are apparently 
forged during early development by momentous biological events of universal signifi-
cance.‹ Additionally, they substitute such terms within the Freudian text itself, as in 
their quotation from Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: »›We assume, in other 
words, that [a basic emotion] is a reproduction of some experience which contained 
the necessary conditions for discharge …‹« Here, Solms and Nersessian substitute »a 
basic emotion« for Freud’s term »anxiety-state« (both quotations taken from Solms & 
Nersessian: »Freud’s Theory of Affect: Questions for Neuroscience,« [note 31], p. 9).
70 See Chapter 4 »Shame now« in Ruth Leys: From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After, 
Princeton et al. 2007, for an elaboration of how significantly models of »basic emotions« 
differ from Freudian conceptualizations of affect.
71 Panksepp writes: »I suspect that a clarification of the core brain issues (i. e., the pathways 
and neurochemistries for the instinctual id energies) will be essential for establishing a 
substantive foundation for psychoanalytic thought« (Panksepp: »Emotions as Viewed 
by Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience,« [note 8], p. 26).
72 Ludwig Fleck: Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Translated by Frederick Bradley, 
Chicago 1979.
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ing of that which is ›alien‹ in Freud, rather than an engaging with the 
alien as that which is risky or changes the terrain of what is known.73 
Turnbull and Solms, for example, defi ne as the »central psychoanalytic 
claim« the ability of »emotion systems (and the drives that govern them) 
[to] distort cognitive representations of reality, by hĳ acking executive 
resources (through so-called defences). Thus, Freud argued, humans 
are oft en ›irrational‹ (holding patently false beliefs)«.74
While Solms and Turnbull might be watering down the Freudian 
project for the benefi t of their psychoanalytically unconvinced neu-
roscientifi c colleagues (the paper from which this quotation is taken 
appeared in the orthodox cognitive neuroscientifi c journal Cortex), it is 
nonetheless clear that such a gloss of the psychoanalytic project (which 
folds back the Freudian engagement with the unconscious into refer-
ences to distortion and irrationality) does not signifi cantly challenge the 
neuroscientifi c edifi ce as a whole.
Concluding thoughts
What are the implications for neuropsychoanalysis of the argument we 
have elaborated here? Let us be clear. Our aim is not to relish specify-
ing in ever greater detail why the drive ›does not fi t‹ with the empiri-
cal neuroscientifi c data and with the formulations that are brought to 
bear on them. Nor is it to claim that the drive ›does not fi t‹ because 
it is an entity wholly unconstrained by the materialist confi nes of the 
neuroscientifi c endeavour. Equally, we would not wish readers to infer 
that neuropsychoanalytic researchers ought simply to eject the drive as 
too troublesome (and thereby fall in line with much of contemporary 
psychoanalysis in its reformulation of the Freudian project without the 
drive). The readings of neuropsychoanalytic texts that we have pursued 
in this chapter are neither motivated by the desire to challenge the va-
lidity of the empirical neuroscientifi c data, nor intended to bolster the 
arguments of those who contend that psychoanalysis and neuroscience 
are incompatible. What we have att empted to raise to critical visibility 
through these readings, rather, is a set of assumptions that butt resses the 
bridge being constructed within neuropsychoanalysis between Freud’s 
73 Cf. Felicity Callard: »The Taming of Psychoanalysis,« in: Social and Cultural Geography, 4 
(2003), 295−321, for another example of how a disciplinary domain’s engagement with 
psychoanalysis resulted in a domestication of much that is alien within psychoanaly-
sis.
74 Turnbull & Solms: »Awareness, Desire and False Beliefs,« (note 1), p. 1085.
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writings and neuroscientifi c data. That is, we are questioning the read-
ing practices by which a particular formulation of the drive is extracted 
by neuropsychoanalysts from the heterogeneous and tangled textual 
terrain of Freud’s oeuvre, a terrain in which the term drive (both in the 
singular and the plural) comes to address a series of unruly and oft en 
contradictory problematics.
The term ›drive‹ within Freud does not cohere within a single 
›register‹. This, we argue, creates diﬃ  culties for any att empt to secure 
the crossing between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences through a 
concept of drive built around a biological logic – that is, primed to re-
spond to the peremptory demands of self-preservation and endogenous 
bodily needs. If we take seriously Laplanche’s argument that the drive 
represents a deviation from, or mimicry of the vital functions, then the 
current identifi cation and mapping of putative functions, circuits and 
emotion systems within the brain does not – and could not – equate 
to the mapping of the Freudian drive. For such mapping does not ad-
dress the manner in which a certain sexualisation of function inhabits 
and perverts those functional systems, nor how the object of the drive 
emerges as an excessive dimension of the object of need.
It is important to note here that Freud’s theory of the drive does not 
decisively break with the register of self-preservation either. As John 
Fletcher argues, »The aporias of Freud’s theory of the drives arise from 
the fact that the break from the biological concept of the instinct is incom-
plete,« and from the vexed intimacy that is to be found between Freud’s 
conceptualizations of the drive and of the self-preservatory functions.75 
It is far from surprising, therefore, that neuropsychoanalysis is drawn 
to the ›biological‹ formulations of the Freudian drive, and to those texts 
of Freud – such as »Instincts and their Vicissitudes« – where such for-
mulations are most vigorously pursued. But such practices of reading 
and of theorizing ›with Freud‹ run the risk of subsuming the entirety of 
the Freudian project within one’s own already constituted position. The 
question might then be staged: is it possible for neuropsychoanalysis to 
consider how the drive might be disarticulated from a logic of function 
and of need? What, in other words, would it mean for neuropsycho-
analysis to engage the drive as the point of dehiscence from adaptive 
needs rather than as their support? For Laplanche, the use of ›the 
biological‹ in Freud is closely tied to the demands of self-preservation, 
self-regulation and adaptation. The question for neuropsychoanalysis is 
75 John Fletcher: »Introduction: Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Other,« in: Essays 
on Otherness, ed. by Jean Laplanche, London et al. 1999, 1−51, here p. 26.
214 Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard
to what extent might it be possible for the new discipline to uncouple 
its empirical fi ndings from the assumption of such demands. How 
might neuropsychoanalysts read both Freud’s formulations regarding 
the psychical apparatus and neurobiological data concerning activations 
of diﬀ erent systems at diﬀ erent levels of complexity without submitt ing 
them immediately to the normative register of self-preservation?
We are writing at a point at which the fi eld of neuropsychoanalysis 
is litt le more than a decade old. There are still ongoing energetic – and 
sometimes combative – debates taking place both within and beyond 
neuropsychoanalysis concerning its scientifi c status and its epistemo-
logical and ontological underpinnings. As the birthing pangs of a new 
fi eld recede, such debates are likely to diminish (though never entirely 
to dissipate, given the vexed status that any body of thought associated 
with psychoanalysis has within public and intellectual life). It is quite 
possible, then, that the fi eld of neuropsychoanalysis might ›stabilize,‹ 
and come to operate with a set of paradigms, models, concepts and 
defi nitions that are widely accepted by those participating in the re-
search fi eld. (We have indicated, for example, that certain formulations 
regarding the drive – a kind of composite model that draws on research 
by Panksepp, Solms and Yovell – are already beginning to have the 
status of common currency within neuropsychoanalysis.) We choose to 
comment, and thereby intervene, during this relatively early period of 
instability. It is at precisely such an early moment in the constitution 
of an interdisciplinary fi eld that it is easier to recognize – and hence 
analyse – how particular references, quotations, and bodies of knowl-
edge are employed in the service of building that new interdisciplinary 
knowledge. We suggest that current neuropsychoanalytic debates and 
exchanges make visible the intractability of moving between and across 
the axes of self-preservation and of Freudian sexuality. The unruliness 
of the drive in those debates – its refusal to ›fi t‹ – unwitt ingly acts as a 
kind of symptom of this intractability. In oﬀ ering an interpretation of 
this intractability, we tend towards its embrace rather than its rejection 
or occlusion. How might this moment of unruliness be held open, and 
how would the process of att empting to do so reorient some of the 
practices of reading and of experimentation in the fertile seam that is 
neuropsychoanalysis?
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